Buy The Dip? A Look At “Real Revenue” DeFi Coins

23 hours ago 4



TL;DR

  • We look at real-revenue DeFi names – Ethena (ENA), Pendle (PENDLE), and Hyperliquid (HYPE) – and ask: have fundamentals held up while tokens dumped, or are the revenues themselves now under pressure?

  • The answer is mixed:

    • ENA throws off huge fees, but almost all of it is recycled into subsidies to defend TVL, so actual “earnings” to the protocol are tiny.

    • PENDLE’s TVL and revenue have grown into the sell-off – a cleaner “price down, business up” divergence – but the business is still deeply tied to fat DeFi yields.

    • HYPE is a monster cash engine, with >$1.2bn in annualised revenue, with effectively all of it routed to token buybacks – but it’s already priced like a winner and is now cutting fees to keep growth going.

  • The big picture: the market is offering better entry levels for quality names – but the fact that even the winners are cutting take-rates (HYPE) or over-subsidising TVL (ENA) suggests that it’s still too early to declare this as a clean “buy any real-revenue dip” regime.

The “Real Revenue” Framework: What to Actually Measure

When you screen for “real revenue coins”, it’s easy to oversimplify and look for:

“Fees up + token down = value buy.”

On-chain data lets you go deeper. For each protocol, we ask four critical questions:

  1. Fees: Are users still paying, or has activity rolled over?

  2. Revenue: What share of those fees actually accrue to the protocol?

  3. Earnings vs. Incentives: How much is left after token incentives and subsidies?

  4. Valuation: What multiple of the revenue/earnings are we paying at current prices?

DefiLlama conveniently splits most of this into Fees / Revenue / Holders Revenue / Incentives for each protocol.

With that in mind, we will evaluate Ethena (ENA), Pendle (PENDLE), and Hyperliquid (HYPE) – not to find “the healthiest” option, but to show where price–fundamental divergences are real, and where “revenue” is being massaged by fee cuts or incentives.

Ethena (ENA): Big Fees, Thin Earnings, Heavy Subsidies

Ethena is trading at ~$0.28–0.29 with a $2.1bn market cap, generating a massive ~$365m in annualised fees from its $7.3bn Total Value Locked (TVL). However, since most fees are recycled into incentives to maintain high yields, the protocol's actual annualised revenue is only ~$0.6m, leaving almost no net earnings for holders. Buying this dip is not a value play based on current Profit/Loss, but a structural bet that Ethena can eventually normalise subsidies without causing its user base to collapse.

Fee and Revenue Profile

Ethena’s combined USDe contracts on Ethereum now hold roughly $7.3B TVL.

On DefiLlama’s fee dashboard, Ethena looks like a machine:

  • Annualised fees:$365m

  • Cumulative fees:$616m

But the key line here is to look at “revenue”:

  • Annualised revenue: only ~$0.6m

  • Revenue 30d: ~$49k

As for incentives? That’s where the gap comes from: most of the fee flow is effectively recycled into user yield and incentives, leaving minimal net earnings to ENA holders relative to the fee headline.

Pendle (PENDLE): Growth Through the Sell-Off

PENDLE is trading at ~$2.7, down ~64% from its ATH of $7.50. Its circulating market cap is ~$450–460m with a Fully Diluted Value (FDV) of ~$770m.

Fee and Revenue profile

Pendle’s core business is tokenising yield and letting users trade PT/YT pairs. On DefiLlama today:

  • Annualised fees:$45.7m

  • Annualised revenue:$44.9m

  • Annualised holders revenue (vePENDLE):$35.9m

  • Annualised incentives:$10.8m

So:

  • Almost all fees drop through as protocol revenue (take-rate is strong).

  • A big share of that revenue is actually being paid out to locked tokenholders (vePENDLE).

  • Incentives exist, but are relatively modest vs. revenue – the earnings line is still clearly positive.

On the TVL side, Pendle has scaled into the down-cycle:

  • Total TVL recently passed $10bn, with recent data showing figures around $10.3bn and annualised fee revenue around $78m.

The catch for Pendle is DeFi yield’s cyclicality:

  • Pendle monetises on-chain yields. If LSD/LRT yields compress and stablecoin carry goes flat, the demand to lock in yields and trade them will shrink.

A lot of the current revenue is a function of elevated DeFi carry and speculative positioning on funding rates; that can change quickly if macro goes risk-off or if on-chain yields converge to TradFi.

Hyperliquid (HYPE): A Rate-Cutting Revenue Machine

Hyperliquid trades at ~$35–36 with a $9-10bn market cap and a massive engine generating ~$1.21bn in annualised revenue with zero incentive emissions. However, the investment thesis is shifting from "pure cashflow" to "aggressive growth," as the team cuts taker fees by up to 90% on new markets to capture long-tail dominance. Consequently, HYPE is priced as a winner (approx. 8–10x P/S) where future returns depend on these fee cuts successfully driving massive volume expansion.

Fee and Revenue profile

Hyperliquid is now the biggest perps venue by on-chain metrics:

  • Annualised fees:$1.34bn

  • Annualised revenue:$1.21bn

  • Annualised holders revenue:$1.20bn

  • Annualised incentives: $0 (unconfirmed airdrop)

We believe:

  • The revenue is real,

  • There are no clear incentive emissions eating the PnL, or being suspected by users whose main focus is to farm the airdrop other than to use the product

  • Almost all of it is being earmarked for HYPE buyback and burn via the Assistance Fund.

Against a roughly $9–10bn market cap, that’s a P/S near ~8–10x on current DefiLlama numbers – not absurd for a fast-growing exchange, but not bombed-out either.

New Growth Venues

The key nuance for this cycle: Hyperliquid is no longer simply “let the revenue rip and buy back”. It’s now actively:

  • Opening permissionless markets via HIP-3, where market deployers share in fee revenue; and

  • For new HIP-3 markets, slashing taker fees by up to ~90% to bootstrap volumes in long-tail perps (equities, niche assets, etc.). Public posts on HIP-3 and exchange docs outline this “growth mode” fee schedule.

Putting It Together: What’s Mispriced?

After a look at the facts, we arrived at a few working conclusions:

1. “Real revenue” alone is not enough

  • ENA proves that fees ≠ earnings. The protocol shows hundreds of millions of annualised fees and still has almost nothing left for token holders after paying for TVL and user yield.

  • HYPE shows that revenue is endogenous: When the team cuts fees to grow market share, revenue and its multiples move with that decision, not just with user demand.

Any “buy-the-dip” screen that stops at “fees up” will systematically mis-classify these.

2. PENDLE is the clearest “business up, token down” pattern in this set

  • TVL and revenue are both meaningfully higher than at prior highs.

  • Incentives are modest vs. revenue; holders’ share is material.

  • Yet the token is down more than half from the peak.

That doesn’t make it risk-free – it’s still structurally cyclical – but it’s the closest to the classic value shape in this cohort.

3. We’re seeing stress even in the winners

The most important takeaway for timing:

  • HYPE cutting fees to grow new markets

  • ENA maintaining very high subsidy levels to keep USDe attractive

These are both signals that even dominant protocols are feeling the current environment – either on the volume side (perps) or on the “yield competition” side (synthetic dollars).

If the leaders are tinkering with take-rates and incentives, we’re probably not in a regime where you can blindly buy anything with fees and wait for mean-reversion.

The Bottom Line

Yes, there are divergences: PENDLE especially looks like a business that quietly got stronger while its token re-rated lower. HYPE and ENA are both big, real businesses – but their own decisions (fee cuts, subsidies) reveal that this environment is still fragile.

For now, this looks less like a “blind buy-the-dip in anything with fees” moment, and more like a stock-picker’s market inside DeFi, where winning moves include:

  • Rewarding protocols that turn fees into sustainable earnings,

  • Discounting those leaning harder on incentives or fee concessions,

  • Using Aave-style multiples as sanity checks before calling anything “cheap.”

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